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9/11 As a Cause of Paradigm Shift? 
 
 
Preamble 
Paradigm shifts often occur in moments of trauma and profound dislocation. After a relatively 
long period of stability in the international system after 1945, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 has ushered in four dramatic powerful quakes in succession to destabilise the balance of 
power system which had been built around the superpower camps. These quakes have shaken the 
very foundations of the international systemic structures which had held the system steady for 
the previous 50 years. The end of the Cold War in 1989 was the first profound dislocation, 
bringing in its wake two further shocks: the end of bipolarity on the one hand, and; the rapid 
spread of the capitalist mode of production on the other. Globalization took off, spinning such 
theoretically diverse perspectives as Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ and the ‘clash of civilizations’, 
first noted by Bernard Lewis in 1990, but popularized by Samuel Huntington in his 1993 Foreign 
Affairs article.  
 
But the most profound, coming some time later, was by far the most traumatic and horrific. The 
11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks on US targets on American soil were a resounding shock 
to an already uncertain international system. It was this event and its impact on the public psyche 
which may have finally caused a profound and real paradigm shift. That 9/11 did so in American 
thinking and foreign policy conduct, particularly in relation to the Middle East, is the subject of 
this paper. 
 
Looking back, it is clear that the trauma of 9/11 reinforced four existing trends in US policy 
circles in terms of their conceptualization and responses to the complex and dangerous world 
around them: 
 
• To ensure American supremacy and predominance in both economic and military and terms; 
• To adopt pre-emption as a central feature of US foreign policy; 
• To seek to defeat global terrorism and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 
which could also fall into the hands of terrorists; and, 
• To spread democracy to the ‘greater/broader’ Middle East as a political and security imperative 
of the United States. 
 
It is the latter objective that I have singled out as the main feature of the paradigm shift which 
has followed the uncertainties of the post-Cold War international system and the end of 
bipolarity. Democracy promotion has been a strong feature of American foreign policy since the 
beginnings of the twentieth century, but the form it is taking today and the manner in which it is 
being articulated and pursued speaks of something quite different. Democracy promotion has 
become the cornerstone of US’ new thinking on the ‘broader’ Middle East.  
 
The 9/11 Effect 
After the horrific events of 11th September 2001, the ‘greater’ Middle East (including North 
Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan) emerged as George W. Bush’s main foreign 
policy preoccupation, and pursued, some have suggested, for very narrowly defined ends.i While 
interest in ‘regime change’ in Iraq had already been demonstrated from 2000, 9/11 helped in 
creating a security calculus for the Middle East that not only produced the ‘axis of evil’ doctrine 
in January 2002, but also brought into sharp focus in this region the application of the pre-
emptive strike doctrine, and the war on terrorism. With regard to the latter, President Bush’s 20 
September 20001 address to the nation had made US’ position clear: ‘Our war on terror begins 
with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will end until every terrorist group of “global reach” 
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has been found, stopped, and defeated’.ii As the war on terror was unleashing American military 
power against the al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, the president further 
elaborated on 7 October that while ‘today we focus on Afghanistan… the battle is broader. Every 
nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government 
sponsors outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murders themselves’. 
 
In relation to pre-emption, the talk in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was of US preparations for 
a strike on Iraq for its alleged role in the September attacks and the development of weapons of 
mass destruction. Although no links were established, after Afghanistan Iraq was to find itself at 
the top of the US’ hit list, with its leader branded as ‘evil’ by the American president.iii Fears of a 
pre-emptive strike on Iraq were so rife that one of US’ closest regional allies, King Abdullah of 
Jordan, went on the record in October warning of the disastrous consequences of such an act for 
the region and for the US’ finely-balanced anti-terror coalition. He told the Financial Times that 
‘there is no proof of Iraqi responsibility vis-à-vis the September 11 attacks,’ and that ‘it would be 
a serious blow if Iraq was targeted and it would be detrimental to the international effort against 
terrorism’.iv Taking no heed, President Bush reinforced his administration’s growing anti-Iraq 
position by hinting twice in two days in November 2001 that action could be taken against Iraq.  
 
By late 2002, the need for political reform (democratization) in the greater Middle East had 
became an added condition of US’ concerns over guaranteeing global security, creating with one 
stroke a security-democratization nexus in the Middle East region.v This was an unprecedented 
development in this region. Regime change (in the context of countering terrorism and 
preventing the spread of WMDs in the wrong hands), imposed democratization, and far-reaching 
reform emerged as the key drivers of the Bush administration’s agenda, causing considerable 
anxiety across the region. If the Clinton legacy was to be summed up as one of ‘profound 
politicization of foreign affairs’,vi then surely George W. Bush’s must be seen in terms of the 
profound ideologization of the same. By end of 2002 the roots of the Bush doctrine were to be 
found in the exercise of hard power at the expense of the use of soft power.vii Three cardinal 
principles acted as the drivers of his doctrine: pre-emption as a central feature of US foreign 
policy, ensuring American supremacy and predominance in military and economic terms through 
the utilization of whatever means necessary,viii and finally, the spread of democracy to the 
Muslim Middle East, particularly the Arab world, as a political and security imperative of the 
United States. But it was the post-9/11 war on terror, conducted against al-Qaeda and its related 
militant Islamist groups, which became the single most important dimension of Bush’s 
interaction with the Middle East. The multi-faceted and multi-dimensional war on terror 
threatened the stability of many of America’s regional partnerships, at the same time as affording 
the regional actors the chance to jump on the bandwagon of the US-led anti-terror campaign. 
 
At the same time, the US position fuelled suspicion in virtually every Muslim state capital. 
Friend and foe alike feared the consequences of further large and direct interventions in the 
Middle East. But as will be shown, Middle East responses to the ‘Bush challenge’ were by no 
means uniform. In broad terms, the differences were two things. Over emphasis when it came 
down to the war on terror and the hunt for al-Qaeda; and over substance when it came to the 
spread of democracy to the Arab world and the ‘greater Middle East’. Ironically, as most of 
America’s Arab allies were autocracies of the first order any way, already engaged in their own 
bloody campaigns against radical Islamist groups, the strengthening of security relations with the 
United States in the global war on terror not only helped them consolidate these security ties with 
the US, but at the same time afforded them the opportunity to tighten their grip on power without 
much fear of retribution from the West. But not all Middle East states warmed to America’s war 
on terror. Saudi Arabia, for example, 15 of whose nationals were amongst the 9/11 al-Qaeda 
conspirators and bin Laden himself was of that country, felt the heat of US reactions; as indeed 
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did Iran, though for very different reasons. But other MENA countries, from North Africa 
through to Oman and Yemen found common cause with the United States in this campaign. 
Ruling regimes in Egypt, Jordan and several Gulf Arab states formed the Middle East frontline in 
the anti-al-Qaeda drive, sweeping up in the process many of their own Islamist opponents. Even 
Sudan, Syria and Libya, which were not known for their affections for the US, joined the 
bandwagon. 
 
But the democratization drive did get virtually every state’s back up. From Iran westwards, 
Washington’s agenda was seen as blatant interference in domestic affairs of sovereign 
international actors. Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular, both close US allies it must be 
emphasized, objected most strongly to the tenor and content of the administration’s reform 
agenda. 
 
The New Paradigm in Action 
The fall of Baghdad in the spring of 2003 has for the first time since the Iranian revolution of 
1979 added real impetus to the Arab Shias’ cries for a stronger political voice in the Arab world. 
The fall of Iraq’s Sunni-dominated Ba’ath regime has enabled the Shia to emerge as a powerful 
political force in the Arab world, and by virtue of their numbers in such an strategically 
important country as Iraq, has given them a greater hand than ever before in the shaping of the 
political map of the fractured and highly polarized Arab system.  
 
The fall of Baghdad at the hands of the US armed forces in April 2003 lifted, possibly for good, 
the centuries-old Sunni domination of Mesopotamia and the pivotal Shia sites of central and 
southern Iraq. In the words of Ali Allawi, ‘for the first time in modern history, the fall of the 
regime confronted Iraqis with the question of where their true loyalties and identities lay’.ix 
 
As we have witnessed since, the end of the Ba’ath regime instantaneously and effectively 
invigorated the Shia communities of Iraq, mobilizing them into mass action. Within months of 
the fall of Baghdad several hundred ulama and their families decamped from their refuge in Iran 
(and elsewhere) and returned to the cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kazemiah... to rediscover their holy 
pasts and to engage in the task of rebuilding their country. Some came with their new Iranian 
families, but most came to build new homes and help in the rebuilding of the Shia holy sites and 
cities. They all also brought with themselves massive extra power. Though low key at first, the 
marking of the two key Shia festivals of Ashura and Tasua in Najaf and Karbala in late spring 
2003 demonstrated to the world for the first time in generations the cultural depth and vigour of 
Shiism in Iraq. The same act also gave fright to those Sunni neighbours who had for years feared 
the emergence of a ‘Shia international’ that would openly challenge their interpretation of Islam, 
on the one hand, and also ultimately threaten their regimes by demanding more rights for the 
Shia minorities in those states, on the other. King Abdullah II of Jordan’s ‘Shia crescent’ 
problem was already rearing its head when the same festivals were being marked in Lebanon and 
Pakistan with equal vigour. 
 
It can be suggested therefore that there was another important dimension to ‘Muslim politics’ 
which had been overlooked by the Bush policy makers in Washington as they prepared to wage 
war on Iraq: that of an intra-Islamic dispute being violently contested in places like Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Salafi Islam took on the US as well as the Shias as its common enemy, unleashing 
violence against both in equal measure. Ironically though, 9/11 brought an unexpected, but 
badly-needed, sense of purpose to the Muslims, whose own civilization was already tearing itself 
apart over ideology, purpose, governance, distribution of political and economic power, and 
control of the Muslim agenda in a post-bipolar world. Many commentators had failed to notice, 
for example, that before 9/11 an intensive ‘clash of civilizations’ was already going on in 
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Afghanistan between various Muslim states supporting or fighting the Taliban. Today, this same 
kind of turf war is going on in Iraq. Where it will strike tomorrow, nobody can tell, but the rise 
of the Shia will grow to impinge on many domains hitherto assumed to be the prerogative of the 
Sunni majority in the MENA region. The movement we can surely detect; its direction and 
intensity, however, is much harder to predict at this stage. 
 
On another front, the impression of intervention as part of a grand strategy was further reinforced 
by the democratization component of the Bush doctrine. President Bush brought this issue to the 
forefront of his national security strategy in November 2003, in the course of two major 
speeches, delivered in Washington (6 November) and London (19 November) respectively.x In 
speaking of a ‘forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East,’ he spoke of the need to change 
America’s relations with the region. In Washington, the president put the emphasis on the need 
for reform, ‘the freedom deficit,’ he said, ‘has terrible consequences for the people of the Middle 
East and for the world. In many Middle Eastern countries poverty is deep and it is spreading, 
women lack rights and are denied schooling, whole societies remain stagnant while the world 
moves ahead’.xi In London, however, he was more critical of the inter-state bargain between the 
West and its authoritarian elites. He said that ‘we must shake off decades of failed policy in the 
Middle East…in the past [we] have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the 
sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this 
bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered 
and ideologies of violence took hold’.xii  
 
Together, these speeches demonstrated his administration’s Wilsonian appetite for democracy 
promotion in the Middle East, and the Arab world in particular. The forward strategy of freedom 
was to become as controversial in regional terms as the war on terror and its associated pre-
emptive military campaign in Iraq.  
 
The elements of the democratization campaign as a security imperative of the United States 
found even more concrete expression in the United States’ 2004 ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’. 
In this, the impact of 9/11 as cause of paradigm shift is laid bare. The initiative, in its original 
form was brought to international attention by Vice-President Dick Cheney at the World 
Economic Forum meeting in Davos in January 2004, being called ‘the most ambitious U.S. 
democracy effort since the end of the Cold War’.xiii Its existence was made public a year after the 
Arab world’s own ‘Arab Charter’, which Saudi Arabia tabled in January 2003. The charter, 
which was seen as a revolution of sorts in its own right, had called for ‘internal reform and 
enhanced political participation in the Arab states’.xiv The later US plan, by contrast, had 
encompassed a wide range of diplomatic, cultural and economic measures. The GMEI had 
deliberately moved the agenda on by calling for the United States and its European allies and 
partners (in the G-8 Group, NATO, and the EU) to press for and assist free elections in the 
Middle East, foster the growth of new independent media there, press for judicial reforms, help 
create a ‘literate generation’ by helping to cut regional illiteracy rates in half by 2010, train 
‘literacy corps’ of around 100,000 female teachers by 2008, finance the translation of Western 
classical texts into Arabic to foster better understanding of the West amongst Muslims, establish 
an European-style Greater Middle East Development Bank, an IFC-style Greater Middle East 
Finance Corporation to assist the development of larger enterprises, and give $500 million in 
micro-loans to small entrepreneurs, especially women, in order to spur 1.2 million small 
entrepreneurs out of poverty. 
 
The concern from the region, however, was that the 2004 US initiative, as its predecessors in 
2003, had tried to explain its arrival in purely Western security terms – ‘So long as the region’s 
pool of politically and economically disenfranchised individuals grows, we will witness an 
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increase in extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal migration,’ its early 2004 draft 
stated.xv Furthermore, there was a concern that the initiative perceived the region in largely Cold 
War terms. It, for example, spoke of creating MENA security structures based on the 1975-
launched Helsinki process and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. It anticipated that a 
complex set of security structures could bring six Middle East countries, including Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar and Israel, into partnership with NATO. But, leaving such 
prominent regional players as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia out of such regional security 
arrangements would only fuel discontent, creating new divisions, and breeding further instability 
across national boundaries.  
 
It was precisely because of the ambiguities attached to the initial proposal that President Husni 
Mubarak of Egypt ‘denounced with force the ready-for-use prescriptions proposed abroad under 
cover of what are called reforms’.xvi The voices of some other Arab leaders, including those from 
Jordan, Morocco, Syria, were added to this objection, all rejecting the plan as an external 
imposition as the news of it began to filter out in February 2004. ‘No matter how well-intended 
the Americans and Europeans say their initiatives are, it will take more than words to comfort 
skeptical Arab rulers and a worried Arab public. The regimes see many signs suggesting that the 
United States is determined to enforce change or ‘reforms,’ while the public—initially desperate 
for real reforms—suspect that the foreign calls for democracy are only an excuse to interfere in 
the region and redraw it in accordance with the West’s own interests. The occupation of Iraq and 
the disinterest in Palestinian suffering have reinforced those fears’, noted the Cairo Times.xvii  
 
The role of the US factor has been in evidence in the political processes of an ally such as Saudi 
Arabia, as well as in those of an adversary such as Iran. In Iran’s February 2004 parliamentary 
elections, in which Iran’s conservative forces manipulated the electoral roll in order to ensure the 
defeat of the reformist camp in the poll for the Seventh Majlis, one could feel the ghost of US 
power present in every debate. In the end, a real fear of the US’ policy agenda in the Persian 
Gulf sub-region encouraged the success of the conservative factions in the parliamentary 
elections. The irony of the impact of the US factor in these elections has been deliciously 
captured by an editorial in the Guardian newspaper, which read as follows: ‘Tension between 
the secular and religious in Iran is nothing new. What has changed is the external context. Iran 
feels tremendous pressure, principally from the US, over nuclear arms, terrorism, human rights 
and the occupation of neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan… Alive to these threats and exploiting 
them, anti-western mullahs seem to be circling the wagons. Thus has George Bush’s grandiose 
bid to democratise the Middle East helped produce in Iran the exact opposite; a democratic 
derailment’.xviii Is the US’ democratization drive for a pluralist future in the Middle East in fact 
further de-democratizing the region? Are its double-standards and contradictory policies in fact 
emboldening the conservative and radical forces in the Muslim Middle East, while undermining 
the position of the very progressive reformists it desperately needs to see in power in order to 
push through the roots and braches reforms it wants to see introduced? With the region now 
regarding the United States as part of the problem, it is hard to predict how Washington intends 
to nurture the rise of democratic forces in the region, and see democracy introduced when one of 
the first acts of such democrats (as much in response to the demands of their constituents, as their 
own conscience) will be to condemn the US superpower for its occupation of Iraq, for the 
behaviour of its troops and political agents there, for its unconditional support for Israel and 
blatant disregard for international law and norms in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and for its 
continuing support for many of the region’s authoritarian regimes. Is a direct but unintentional 
outcome of the Bush doctrine the birth of an illiberal democracy as the norm that the peoples of 
the region will have to endure in the twenty first century? It is still too early to tell, but much of 
the outcome will depend on what kind of an Iraq emerges from the ashes of war and decades of 
destruction. It is hard to see how the administration’s other noble goal of democratizing the 
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Middle East can be squared with the underlying currents which have driven the Bush doctrine in 
the president’s second term. 
 
Conclusion 
President Bush’s second term was welcomed by many commentators as the opportunity to 
consolidate the democratizing pusch of the Bush doctrine. Typical of these was Harvey 
Sicherman, who reflected optimistically on the Bush administration’s balance-sheet: ‘As 
President Bush begins his second term, his policy to transform the Greater Middle East faces 
crucial milestones. America is committed to nurturing new democracies in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Palestine, an astonishing about-face since 9/11 for an Administration originally hostile to 
nation-building altogether. Thus, it may be said that whatever the prospects in the Middle East, 
U.S. foreign policy itself has surely been transformed. Will it work? A thousand obstacles 
obstruct the way, yet some things have begun to move. Insofar as elections signal a potentially 
democratic direction, 2005 begins with important auguries for the development of local partners 
capable of working with the United States. Sharon’s new government gives proof of his 
readiness to withdraw from Gaza. The vote for Abu Mazen ratified a potential Palestinian partner 
for peace. Renewed Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, taken in tandem with local legislative and 
party elections scheduled for late this year, could give a big boost to a nascent Palestinian 
democracy’.xix Sicherman went on to argue that ‘for the advocates of democracy in the Middle 
East, the Palestinian and Iraqi elections focus on a quintessential virtue: citizen choice. Yet this 
beginning, potentially the birth throes of popular government, should also remind us of the 
distance yet to go. These polls will matter little if in the end those who oppose democracy can 
abort the results through violence. U.S. policy will still be poised on the brink of failure so long 
as that battle remains in doubt’. It would be ironic to reflect on the shortcomings of the Bush 
strategy since when looking at the Middle East, were it not for the tragedy of what has unfolded 
in the meanwhile: Iraq is little more than a basket case as we approach the twilight of the Bush 
presidency, Palestine (in the heart of the Levant) is in real danger of ‘somaliazation’, fires 
burning in Lebanon are in constant danger of blowing out of control, and Iran seems ready for a 
fight with the US (and whomever that stands alongside it) more or less at any cost. 
 
Nevertheless, Sicherman’s perceptive analysis reminds one of an earlier set of equally insightful 
comments made by the president of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in November 
2002.xx Shortly before the Iraq war, a Bush insider and Pentagon staffer confided to the New 
Yorker magazine that ‘you have the phenomenon that this greater freedom that came to Latin 
America, that came to various parts of Asia, largely missed the Middle East. And there is all 
kinds of writing on the subject, on whether there is anything inherently incompatible between 
either Muslim culture, or Arab culture, and this kind of freer government. This Administration 
does not believe there is an inherent incompatibility. And if Iraq had a government like that, and 
if that government could create some of those institutions of democracy, that might be 
inspirational for people throughout the Middle East to try to increase the amount of freedom that 
they have, and they would benefit both politically and economically by doing so’.xxi What a 
difference five years can make, when set against the reality on the ground in Iraq. 
 
What is now widely acknowledged, therefore, is that the difficulty that the administration 
continues to face well into its final term is how to square its militaristic instincts with the 
implementation of long-lasting reforms in the Middle East. Being a prisoner of its own 9/11-
driven doctrine, the way forward seems to be found only in the efforts to deal with the 
inconsistencies of the war on terror itself.xxii While there is time, this has to be refined by the 
administrationxxiii before it can safely take forward any strategy of freedom so loudly announced 
back in 2002, or indeed be able to hand on a positive legacy from its adventures in the Middle 
East to the next American administration.  
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